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Abstract: Why is there resistance in acknowledging emotional arguments? I explore the ambiguity entrenched in 
the emotional mode of argument, which may contribute to the lack of widespread agreement about its existence. In 
particular, belief systems and personality styles are addressed, as they are integral to the emotional mode of 
argumentation. This multidisciplinary approach neither advocates nor dismisses the emotional mode; it adds another 
layer of understanding to the literature that is important to consider.  
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1. Introduction  
 
As a Critical Thinking instructor, I teach students to de- and re- construct arguments—a process 
that largely distills emotion from an argument’s core structure. This method is in line with many 
Critical Thinking texts that outline methods for diagramming arguments [e.g., Groarke & 
Tindale, (2013), Govier, (2010), and Vaughn & MacDonald, (2016) to name a few]. Informal 
Logicians largely abstain from incorporating emotion into the structure of arguments; 
presumably, this is partly because it causes subsequent havoc with respect to a normative 
evaluation of arguments. More importantly, we may not even be able to agree descriptively on 
what the emotional argument is. As a community mediator, I facilitate communication between 
parties that acknowledges and addresses emotion. Realistically, in a conflict resolution context 
where practitioners are aiming to guide disputants to come to mutually agreed upon and feasible 
resolution(s), we cannot ignore emotions that are present. They are part of the disputants’ 
arguments. They drive them sometimes; they are entangled in claims and reasons other times; 
and both of these circumstances are quite different from the emotional expression of arguments. 
While it would be admittedly easier to separate emotion from reasoned arguments, it simply will 
not work for long-term, sustainable resolutions, especially between parties who have to continue 
to engage with each other post-mediation (i.e., co-workers, neighbours, family members, etc.). In 
fact, separating emotion from the dialogue may impede agreement on a settlement at all in this 
context. These two examples are important to consider. In higher education, some goals include 
preparing post-secondary students for employment (Klassen & Dwyer, 2015), or at least guiding 
students to be competent lay people (Battersby, 2005). And yet what I practice in a real-world 
context is not adequately addressed by a field that deals with the real practice of argumentation. 
It is this inconsistency that motivates more work on the emotional mode of argumentation.  
 That emotion is present in dialogic arguments is not a contentious claim to make for 
argumentation theorists; however, whether those emotional aspects of arguments are strong, or 




justifying the emotional mode of argument; rather, it takes a deeper look into the nature of 
emotion in the context of an Argument (O’Keefe, 1982). Given the resistance for a more 
“universal,” or widely agreed upon, approach to recognizing emotional arguments—even on a 
descriptive level, let alone a normative one, I turn to exploring the cognitive structures that tether 
emotional arguments and the psychological attributes that function as emotional outputs in real 
argumentative scenarios. This is done in an effort to showcase primarily emotional arguments, 
instead of categorizing emotion as peripheral to an argument’s core logical structure.  
 An emotional argument occurs when the dissent between arguers is of an emotional 
nature; in other words, the persuasive strength in an interactive argument comes from emotion.  
The descriptive approach to emotional arguments in Dissent in the Midst of Emotional Territory 
(Carozza, 2007), with an additional criterion, offers a delineation of emotional arguments that 
holds for this essay:  
 
 i. Emotions can be used to express arguments (Gilbert, 1997). 
 ii. Emotions can be used as grounds for a claim (Ben-Ze’ev, 1995; Gilbert, 1997). 
 iii. Emotions can make up a claim (Plantin, 1999). 
 iv. Empathic emotions of the audience can be appealed to (Walton, 1992). 
 v. Emotions of fear in an audience can be evoked (Walton, 1992). 
 vi. Emotions of joy in an audience can be evoked (Borchers, 2012). 
 
2. Neuroscience: An explanation for entrenched biases  
 
Bobula, a Child Development Specialist and Early Childhood Educator, studies “self-regulation” 
in children. Self-regulation is the ability to act in a deliberate, planned manner in governing 
one’s own behaviour (Bodrovat & Leong, 2007, p. 127). Self-regulation is thus commonly 
referred to as impulse control, or self-control - physically, socially, and emotionally. Early 
Childhood Educators are continually teaching self-regulation to young children. Through her 
research on self-regulation in Early Childhood Education, Bobula (2011) found that “implicit 
bias” (or, unconscious bias) is a necessary consideration for teachers. Implicit bias, as she 
describes it, necessarily includes emotional standpoints. An example of implicit bias that she 
shares reads: “an employer who, having several equally qualified job applicants, chooses the one 
who is a member of his/her in-group citing that the applicant would ‘fit in’ better with co-
workers” (Bobula, 2011, p. 8). This functions as a subtle, implicit, mechanism of category 
association, where categories span multiple identity politics: race, sex, gender, age, etc. 
Typically, implicit biases are developed in early childhood, and their enactment—at any stage—
is not backed by conscious consideration. What follows from this, given the example above, is 
that a hiring committee may consciously profess to practice inclusivity or diversity, but there can 
be implicit biases at play that make their choices of exclusion unbeknownst to them. Implicit 
biases are different from explicit ones, which are conscious forms of bias. Actually excluding a 
group, or individual, from a meeting, or verbal harassment are examples of explicit forms of 
bias. 
 The development of biases, generally speaking, can be explained with neuroscience, the 
study of the brain and nervous system. Consider that to have memory of something, or to learn 
something, the following occur: 1) when we have experiences, at a cellular level, our neurons 
communicate with each other; 2) the more experiences we have strengthens the connections 




memory, or knowledge, of X (e.g., knowing how to make a bowtie or do long division). It is 
important to note here that when we do learn something (that we do not forget), our neurons 
physiologically change in an effort to make even more connections, which amount to expanded 
knowledge. We can learn how to mentally multiply a single-digit by another single-digit without 
any aids, and when we grasp this well, we can learn to mentally multiply a double-digit by a 
single-digit, or at least the cognitive framework has been exercised for learning this mechanism. 
This lays the foundation for multiplying a double-digit by another double-digit mentally, and so 
on. The more that we learn, the stronger the connections between neurons that allows for long-
term memory (e.g., factual information, knowledge) and working memory (e.g., tasks related to 
school or work). Analogously, these experiences can also be emotional (developing emotional 
responses), or they can be evaluative in nature (learning to make judgments). These types of 
experiences that involve emotion are housed under long-term memory, and the same pattern 
needs to occur: the more emotional experiences we have, the deeper or stronger the emotional 
memory (Bobula, 2011, p. 6). What happens is the experiences we have—actions, emotional 
responses, or evaluative judgments—get “wired” into our brains. With this explanation, then, 
learning how to tie a shoelace, learning that young males are fast, irresponsible drivers 
(stereotype!), and feelings of joy when you see a nuclear family that has a (male) father, (female) 
mother, and two children, cognitively speaking, occur in a similar fashion.  
 Now, what does this neuroscientific discussion have to do with emotional arguments? 
Emotional arguments have deep connections with arguers’ biases. Bias is a prejudice in support 
of or against some thing, person, or group. That we do not always understand each other’s ideas, 
wants, needs, or desires—in part—is because we have different biases that prompt our actions 
and beliefs. This is also what makes the development of a “universal” standard for diagramming 
or evaluating emotional arguments tricky business. These are not neutral stances—we cannot 
grasp them through objective standards, like we can in formal logic or arithmetic.  
 Walton (1992) writes that bias in an argument is characterized as an arguer having i) a 
lack of balance or neutrality, and/or ii) a lack of critical doubt (p. 266). These can impede good 
argumentation depending on the context and dialogue (i.e., a pragmatic and dialectical concept). 
Walton connects bias specifically to emotional appeals. Emotional appeals become fallacious 
when they target an audience’s bias such that the audience is impeded from practicing balance or 
critical doubt. The audience thus reacts in accordance with his/her vested interests (Walton, 
1992, p. 264). These are instances of explicit bias though, as an arguer in these types of appeals 
employs  “targeting” behaviour. While a specific audience may have trouble noticing this given 
their vested interests, most of us who are detached from the argumentative context can recognize 
such manipulative ploys. This is not the type of bias that I address in this paper, and so in the 
ensuing discussion only three of the six types of emotional arguments are important to consider.  
 When emotion is used in the following manners, implicit—or unconscious—bias may be 
present in arguments: emotion used to express an argument (Gilbert, 1997), emotions used as 
grounds for a claim (Ben-Ze’ev, 1995; Gilbert, 1997), and emotion used as a claim (Plantin, 
1999). These are situations where the arguer, not the audience, employs emotion. In these 
contexts we cannot easily charge an arguer with manipulative tactics, as we can in some appeals 
to emotions. Using emotion in the construction of your argument likely indicates that there is an 
important belief, tethered by a bias underlying the emotion infused in the argument. What 
follows is an extended example that I subsequently refer to in the discussion of emotions, beliefs, 





3. Marriage Mediation 
 
My co-mediator and I knew we were in for a challenge as we waited for a couple to attend their 
first mediation session. The goal of the mediation was to help the pair develop strategies for 
living and speaking with each other, or a separation was likely imminent. In case development, 
this is done separately with each party, the husband—a recently retired, energetic, extraverted, 
love-life type, explained that he was relying on mediation to save his relationship. His wife 
won’t see a marriage counselor (he’s tried this in the past). He needs to find a way to make her 
understand that their marriage is in big trouble. According to him, she doesn’t quite understand 
the gravity of their situation. He wants her to come home from work happier, engage with him, 
talk to him, maybe even go out on a date with him. He doesn’t understand how it’s happened, but 
they are simply roommates now, living in the same home but with different bedrooms, eating 
schedules, etc. He won’t sleep in the same room as her because he’s so upset. He doesn’t think 
she even cares. The husband was friendly, exuberant at times, a charming man who self-
identified as being very social, and it was obvious from being around him too. Bottom line: he 
wants to remain married. He’s attracted to his wife and cannot imagine being with anyone else. 
He just needs to get through to her.  
 When we met with his wife, a few years younger and still employed full-time, she took a 
more detached, calmer approach to her marital situation. She was not happy with the way the 
household was being run. She is at work all the time, and when she comes home she wants to 
relax. She wants to have a quiet dinner and watch TV. She can’t do this when her husband has 
random people popping in—the neighbours, family (this includes their adult children), friends, 
and so on. She complained that her home had a revolving door, and she was angry. Her husband 
is too “social” to even understand that she has a legitimate concern. Bottom line: she doesn’t 
think there’s anything to do—she and her husband are different people; they are not compatible 
anymore. When asked if she would consider a divorce, financial security (for both of them) was 
given as a sole reason for remaining in the marriage. Maybe one day they’d be a couple again, 
maybe not. 
 From a surface analysis, the pair exemplify different modes of discussion and 
argumentation. The husband is more emotional, in terms of his expression, and even the reasons 
for his claims.  He was obviously invested in the relationship. The wife had a more logical 
approach—little emotion was obvious. This, however, does not imply that she wasn’t acting on 
her emotions. In mediation, each party has the opportunity to explain the situation from his/her 
perspective without interruption from anyone. The husband kept interrupting his wife when she 
spoke. Everything that she said was questioned, or counter-examples were put forward to show 
the flaws in her thoughts (which happen to both be logical strategies), or sheer emotion was 
expressed in response. The wife said that her main concern was the amount of socializing her 
husband does at home, and she needs that to change. If friends didn’t have the keys to her front 
door, and if she could have quiet weeknights, she would be happier and less angry. Her husband 
did not seem to understand this though. When we asked him to paraphrase (i.e., technique of 
“reframing”) what his wife needs from him, he had no clue. He just defended their family and 
friends. He urged her to be more open and friendly.  
 When the husband demonstrated high emotion (e.g., emotive language, facial 
expressions, voice tone and level, flush) he wasn’t just showing how committed he was to the 
dialogue, he was showing beliefs and biases too. These are not always easy to detect, and in the 




these. An explicit belief that he shared was that family and friends were the most important 
aspect of life. A bias underpinning this belief he articulated is a joy that is connected to having 
people (e.g., adult children, their friends, extended family members) present, continuously. This 
was obvious enough to the mediators. Even further, he could have a fear associated with 
worthiness (wanting to be needed) and loneliness that are cropping up at this time in the marriage 
because the husband is newly retired.   
 Though the wife in this case presented as a reasonable, listening, non-interruptive party, it 
does not mean that there was no emotion present to guide her arguments and responses. There 
were. In this case, a belief system of the wife’s was financial freedom is important at this stage of 
life—this was an explicit statement. A bias that underlies this belief is class-related. Separating 
from her husband would necessitate selling the family home, and neither would be able to afford 
such a large home with a pool individually. Neither would be able to continue their collection of 
motorcycles, a passion they share. They would have mortgages again, etc. This implicit bias 
made it difficult for the wife to take a threatened separation seriously. Perhaps it even explains 
her laissez-faire attitude. She was not worked up about the relationship being on the rocks.  
 Someone might charge this case as one that belongs to therapists or counselors to take 
care of, not argumentation theorists. This is dismissive in nature. There are individuals in 
different levels of government, in legal practice, mediation, service work such as hospitality, and 
even in social work settings that deal with these types of communication practices that are 
blatant “interruptions” of logic, and that (I may argue at a future time) are pseudo-logical 
arguments; that is, arguments where emotion guides the reason, and there is little in the way of 
understanding and addressing them from Argumentation Theory. Lawyers don’t turn cases away 
because a client needs counseling; front lines complaint workers cannot tell a complainant to 
seek therapy and then come back to lodge a “coherent” complaint, or at least they shouldn’t. 
When you deal with arguments in such concentration, you need more tools.  
 Implicit biases that prompt emotional arguments can be problematic, not because they are 
emotional arguments but because they can stem from biases that are unknown to the arguer, 
his/her audience, and third party observers, since they are unconscious to us. Bobula (2011) 
claims that under pressure we tend to revert to our implicit biases (p. 23). The same can be said 
when an argument context is really important to us. We hang tight to our learned biases. Our 
biases prompt our arguments and these affective processes aren’t all easily addressed with 
reason.  
 
4. Neuroscience: Methodology for emotional arguments   
 
For Bobula (2011), unlearning biases is a process of self-regulation, and she refers to 
psychologists and neuroscientists who have offered mechanisms for doing so. Given research 
and methodologies from neuroscience, arguments that are emotional in nature could learn from 
this field. Rather than using the normative parameters in informal logic to address the emotional 
mode, practices analogous to cognitive ones could be used instead. One of the mechanisms that 
Bobula summarizes, that could work in arguments that use emotion, follows.  
 Interpersonal experiences that present challenges, or counterpositions to one’s implicit 
bias, can aid in lessoning the grip of a given bias (Livingston & Drwecki, 2007, p. 822). Several 
examples are glossed over by Bobula (2011)—contexts related to race, age, gender, and other 
stigmatized groups. For instance, if you assume that a disabled person is not smart, befriending 




should change this implicit bias. Why couldn’t we apply an analogous method in argumentation? 
Dialogic arguments practiced sincerely and with an open-mind (i.e., principle of charity, truth-
seeking, burden of proof) can help arguers become aware of biases, (a step towards unlearning 
implicit ones?).  
 Bobula (2011) writes, “Repetition strengthens connections and lack of use weakens 
connections in the brain. For people who are highly motivated to reduce their implicit biases and 
who adopt one or more of the strategies described, repetition of the strategy will strengthen those 
neural networks and, in turn, may weaken the stereotypical one. Every time we employ one of 
these strategies, we make an investment for an unbiased future” (p. 30). Awareness of implicit 
biases can have a ripple effect in dialogic argument settings. It can prompt a discussion about the 
bias, and how it is impinging on the argument, and maybe it can help with the “unlearning” of 
implicit biases—though this is likely not possible unless there are multiple arguments that an 
arguer engages in where the bias is discussed. I argue that unlearning a bias, while a good thing 
and indicative of the success of emotional argumentation, is not necessary for the argument to 
take place productively.  
  
5. Conflict resolution mechanisms   
 
This section, which concentrates on personality conflict styles, is much shorter than the emphasis 
placed on neuroscience and cognition in this paper. It’s incorporated to compound the claim that 
we are not doing enough to understand the nature of emotional arguments and how they are 
communicated.  
 Oudeh and Oudeh (2006) delineate five distinct conflict management styles. When in an 
argumentative dialogue, any type of dialogue, arguers employ one or more conflict styles. The 
authors frame these conflict styles as each having unique strengths and challenges. Summarized, 
succinctly, no style is bad. Successful conversants have an awareness of their style(s), an 
understanding of how others’ are conversing in an argumentative situation, and how these 
manners can be navigated to reach mutual resolutions.  
 Brief descriptions of the five conflict styles follow. A woodpecker is interested in 
resolving conflict in a way that satisfies the woodpecker’s wants and needs. Like real 
woodpeckers, they can be noisy—they will repeat their stance repeatedly until it is accepted. 
They are single-minded in this endeavour (Oudeh & Oudeh, 2006, p. 44). An owl is calmer than 
a woodpecker. They are conscious of being fair and just to everyone involved in the conflict 
setting. They tend to be observant (i.e., will search for data, etc.), and slow to make a final 
decision. This is because they want it to be the correct decision. They are truth-seekers (Oudeh & 
Oudeh, 2006, p. 84). A parakeet is friendly, talkative. Parakeets lighten the mood in a conflict 
setting. They tend to agree with what others say, as their goal is to make sure everyone is happy. 
To do this, they usually abstain from any topics that are contentious. Preserving the relationships 
involved is of utmost importance to a parakeet (Oudeh & Oudeh, 2006, p. 63). A hummingbird 
has a typical negotiation style. They quickly brainstorm different options and latch onto the first 
one that everyone can agree on. Efficiency in mutual-decision making is key for a hummingbird 
(Oudeh & Oudeh, 2006, p. 123). And, finally, an ostrich is uncomfortable in situations of 
conflict, so they avoid it all costs. Sometimes this translates into not responding to phone calls or 
emails, or just fleeing the scene. They prefer to just “agree to disagree” (Oudeh & Oudeh, 2006, 




 As an example of how conflict styles relate to an argumentative dialogue. Consider the 
mediation described above. In that setting there were several styles present. The husband 
functioned primarily as a woodpecker, or turned into a parakeet. He was expressive, emotional, 
social, talkative, and he kept driving the same point home: his wife needs to change, 
immediately. This makes him primarily a woodpecker. He left the first session with little to no 
acknowledgment of his wife’s needs. Periodically, he would be friendly and acquiesce to a 
mediator’s direction. The husband is likely a stronger parakeet than woodpecker, but he was 
distressed. The wife was primarily an ostrich, but sometimes she showed elements of an owl. She 
wouldn’t be affected to engage in the anecdotes and examples that her husband kept introducing 
(e.g. remember that time when . . .). When prompted by a mediator though she would answer a 
question directly, clearly, with reasons, and most of all with awareness of how her answers 
would upset her partner (this is when her partner hadn’t already interrupted). One of the 
mediators presented as a parakeet—acknowledging, understanding, smiling. The other mediator 
functioned as an owl—asking prompting questions, explaining that the couple may be at a 
roadblock because their respective introverted and extraverted dispositions aren’t being 
recognized and managed, etc.  
 In connection with emotional arguments, it may seem like the woodpecker style is the 
least productive when a mutual decision needs to be made, and furthermore that the single-
mindedness of a woodpecker is indicative of high emotion and thus impedes resolutions. And 
maybe this is accurate. What’s less prominent are the other emotions that are guiding the 
dialogue. By definition, an ostrich won’t demonstrate his/her emotions. That doesn’t mean there 
aren’t any present that are integrally affecting the discourse. The wife in this situation was angry. 
She expressed this in case development with the co-mediators, and (less so) in front of her 
husband in the mediation session. Her anger was translated with a detachedness, which had an 
effect of instigating her husband’s frustration, which translated into persistent, repetitive claims 
and reasons.  
 G. Oudeh and N. Oudeh (2006) theorize that the intersection of our conflict styles take on 
a particular pattern. In this case it is certain that the communication the couple had at home, 
building over time, was made up of different intersecting styles. The husband likely used a 
parakeet style for a long time in the marriage, and for a while when their current problems began 
to surface. The wife primarily used an owl conflict style (this was described to irritate the 
husband throughout their married years), but at some point reverted to an ostrich where her 
husband and any of their conversations and interactions were concerned. How does this look 
when they have an argument that needs solving? Verbatim, here is what G. Oudeh and N. Oudeh 
(2001) write of the interaction between these two conflict styles used in a dialogue: “When a 
Woodpecker and an Ostrich have differences, there is usually a delay in the actual conflict” (p. 
150), and, “The more a Woodpecker insists on a specific outcome, the more reticent the Ostrich 
will become” (p. 151), and finally, “With this combination, there will be no resolution until one 
or both parties move to another conflict management style” (p. 151). All of these ring true for the 
couple in mediation. These conflict styles are encased in emotion. While the ones highlighted are 
negative in this example, there can be positive emotions that drive arguments.  
 In the same way that G. Oudeh and N. Oudeh (2006) describe and prescribe remedies for 
conflict styles, argumentation theorists could benefit from analogous tools. For example, the 
silence of an ostrich could be construed, given the dialogue, as a mechanism for (not) expressing 
anger. Ostriches are making arguments implicitly. By not showing up to a mediation session 




it were logical, there would be a verbal reason and claim—there were none. And while I 
acknowledge that this is a physical gesture, in the larger context it’s an output of a highly 
emotional dialogue. I argue that we should be able to figure this out with deep analysis and there 
could be mechanisms that help analyze the effectiveness of such a tactic.  
 
6. Conclusion  
 
Looking at the emotion in argumentative discourse is simply put a more holistic approach to 
arguments. And, if we want to understand arguments, analyze them, respond to them, more 
sincerely and accurately, then we need to widen the lens with which we do so. We need to teach 
Critical Thinking students, for example, that Venn diagrams work in some situations, knowledge 
of fallacy schemes work in some contexts, some level of emotional intelligence is necessary in 
various argumentative circumstances too. And, these are not exhaustive, if we are going to use 
the “toolbox” analogy for Critical Thinking, then let’s really do it, and acknowledge these 
aspects of arguments that have been less popular in Argumentation Theory. Gilbert (1997) 
distinguishes the “logical” skeleton of an argument from the whole context of argument. It’s the 
latter which is more holistic and calls for a wider, more inclusive, collaboration of tools for 
competent lay people. 
 Considering neuroscientific mechanisms and personality constructs changes nothing 
about emotional arguments and maybe everything for argumentation analysis. That is, there 
could be other ways to approach the emotion in arguments, how we should be engaging in and 
analyzing these arguments. We can shift away from a normative framework that has logic rooted, 
ironically it’s our field’s bias, and include or adapt to a more consequentialist analysis of 
arguments. This means that in the mediation between husband and wife, the outcome (mutual 




Battersby, M. (2005). Critical thinking in a life and death situation. In T. Govier (Ed.), A 
Practical Study of Argument (6th ed., pp. 425-427). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. 
Ben-Ze'ev, A. (1995). Emotions and argumentation. Informal Logic 17 (2), 189-200. 
Bobula, K. A.  (2011). This is your brain on bias… or, the neuroscience of bias. Clark College 
Faculty Lecture Series 3 May 2011.  
Bodrovat, E., & Leong, D. J. (2007). Tools of the Mind: The Vygotskian Approach to Early 
 Childhood Education (2nd ed.). NJ: Pearson Education, Inc. 
Borchers, T. (2012). Persuasion in the Media age (3rd ed.). Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press.   
Carozza, L. (2007). Dissent in the midst of emotional territory. Informal Logic 27 (2), 197-210. 
Gilbert, M. A. (1997). Coalescent Argumentation. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 
 Inc. 
Govier, T. (2010). A Practical Study of Argument (7th ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, Engage 
 Learning.  
Groarke, L. A., & Tindale, C. W. (2013). Good Reasoning Matters! A Constructive Approach to 
 Critical Thinking (5th ed.). Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press.   
Klassen, T. R., & Dwyer, J. A. (2015). How to Succeed at University (and Get a Great Job). 




Livingston, R. W., & Drwecki, B. B. (2007). Why are some individuals not racially biased? 
 Susceptibility to affective conditioning predicts nonprejudice toward Blacks. 
 Psychological Science 18 (9), 816-823. 
MacDonald, C., & Vaughn, L. (2016). The Power of Critical Thinking (4th ed.). Don Mills, ON: 
 Oxford University Press. 
O’Keefe, D. J. (1982). The concepts of argument and arguing. In: R. J. Cox, & C. A. Willard 
 (Eds.), Advances in Argumentation Theory and Research (pp. 3-23). Carbondale, IL: 
 Southern Illinois Press.  
Oudeh, G., & Oudeh, N. (2006). Conflict Is for the Birds: Understanding Your Conflict 
 Management Style. Ottawa, ON: CCR International Publishing Inc. 
Plantin, C. (1999). Arguing emotions. In F. H. van Eemeren, R., Grootendorst, J. A. Blair & 
 C. A. Willard (Eds.), Proceedings of the Fourth Conference of the International Society  
 for the Study of Argumentation 16-19 June 1998. Amsterdam, SicSat. 
Walton, D. N. (1992). The Place of Emotion in Argument. PA: Pennsylvania State University 
Press. 
Walton, D. N. (1998). The New Dialectic: Conversational Contexts of Argument. Toronto, ON: 
University of Toronto Press. 
  
